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Abstract
Objectives: Patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) may have difﬁculties in time perception, which in turn might
contribute to some of their symptoms, especially memory deﬁcits. The aim of this study was to evaluate perception of
interval length and subjective passage of time in MCI patients as compared to healthy controls. Methods: Fifty-ﬁve MCI
patients and 57 healthy controls underwent an experimental protocol for time perception on interval length, a
questionnaire for the subjective passage of time and a neuropsychological evaluation. Results: MCI patients presented
no changes in the perception of interval length. However, for MCI patients, time seemed to pass more slowly than it did
for controls. This experience was signiﬁcantly correlated with memory deﬁcits but not with performance in executive
tests, nor with complaints of depression or anxiety. Conclusions: Memory deﬁcits do not affect the perception of
interval length, but are associated with alterations in the subjective passage of time. (JINS, 2016, 22, 755–764)
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INTRODUCTION
The number of patients with cognitive complaints has
been rising as a consequence of the increasing aging of
the population. Clinicians have especially focused on
patients diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment (MCI),
because they carry a high risk for developing dementia in
the ensuing few years. According to the original Mayo
criteria, the presence of memory impairment in patients with
preserved general cognitive function and independence in
basic activities of daily living represent an increased risk of
progression to Alzheimer’s disease (AD; Petersen et al.,
1999). Patients in the initial stages of AD often refer to losing
track of dates, seasons, and the passage of time (Alzheimer’s
Association, 2009). Difﬁculties in placing events in the cor-
rect temporal framework may compromise orientation
and daily planning, since time perception is a crucial com-
ponent of everyday decisions and goal-oriented behaviors
(Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Mangels & Ivry, 2001). However,
there has been scarce research on time perception in patients
with MCI.
Time perception comprises at least two main subjective
time experiences: interval length judgments and the sub-
jective passage of time judgments (Block, 1990; Sucala,
Scheckener & David, 2010; Wearden, 2005). Perception of
interval length concerns the subjective evaluation of a certain
duration and has been mainly approached using two different
paradigms: prospective tasks (participants are told in advance
that they will have to estimate a time interval) and retro-
spective protocols (participants are not told in advance that
they will have to estimate a time interval), as well as two
distinct methods of investigation, verbal time estimation
(participants have to verbally estimate the duration of
different intervals) and verbal time production (participants
have to produce different interval durations). Experiencing
the subjective passage of time involves another type of time
experience that relates to the perceived speed of the time
course: this is typically assessed via ﬁrst-person reports on
the subject’s own feelings on time passage (Friedman &
Janssen, 2010; Wearden, 2005).
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Recent studies on time perception have often been based
on the internal clock model. This model supposes that each
individual has an internal clockwhich is moving slower or faster
according to how temporal judgments about interval length
approach or deviate from real measured time (Droit-Volet
& Wearden, 2003; Grodin, 2010). An oscillatory pacemaker
constantly emitting pulses at the same rate composes the clock,
which processes information along three stages.
First, at the clock stage, the pulses enter into an accumulator
when the switch is open. Attention plays here an important
role; for instance, inattention slows down the internal clock,
producing a lower number of pulses. The memory stage
follows. After the switch is closed, the pulses gated in the
accumulator, which represent the current time, are stored in the
working memory system for comparison with the values
contained in reference memory, that is, the long-term memory
for pulses accumulated in the past. Finally, in the decisional
stage, the values present in working memory are compared
with those stored in the reference memory, allowing a decision
to be made on the perception of time.
The main advantage of this model is to identify the sources
of individual and pathophysiological differences in time
perception and relate them to neuropsychological data (All-
man & Meck, 2012; Nichelli, 1993). It is important to note
that, according to this internal clock model, working memory
and executive functions are determinant mechanisms for time
perception, due to the role of attentional shifts in determining
the perceived speed of the internal clock (Heinik & Ayalon,
2010; Papagno, Allegra, & Cardaci, 2004; Pouthas & Perbal,
2004). Remarkably, episodic memory and prospective and
retrospective memory are also thought to be necessary for
time perception (Graf & Grodin, 2006; Kinsbourne & Hicks,
1990; Mimura, Kinsbourne, & O’Conner, 2000; Schmitter-
Edgecombe & Rueda, 2008). We would then expect that a
population with memory deﬁcits, such as MCI patients,
would present signiﬁcant impairments in time perception.
However, previous studies failed to ﬁnd a clear correlation
between MCI and time perception deﬁcits.
We posit that this lack of results is due to exclusive
emphasis on interval length perception, a cognitive skill
that does not necessarily matters for the kind of long-term
temporal projection involved in episodic and prospective
memory. In studies on perception of interval length, there
was no signiﬁcant difference between MCI patients and
controls in prospectively evaluating short time intervals, that
is, in between 10 and 60 s (Rueda & Schmitter-Edgecombe,
2009). Another study evaluated self-estimation of perfor-
mance time (Heinik & Ayalon, 2010): participants were
asked to estimate retrospectively the actual duration of the
interview (the real duration was 25 to 30min). Self-
estimation of performance time versus actual performance
time was not impaired in MCI patients when compared to
participants without cognitive impairment.
The results of these two experimental studies suggest that
MCI patients have no alterations in the perception of interval
length. Alternatively, methodological limitations of the chosen
tasks might have hindered the detection of those alterations.
First of all, it would be important to assess both the prospective
paradigm and the retrospective paradigm, using the verbal time
estimation as well as the verbal time production methods to
estimate or produce the duration of empty time intervals to
evaluate more extensively the perception of the interval length.
Empty time intervals were preferred in this methodology over
ﬁlled intervals since non-temporal tasks would interfere with
working memory and attention functions and, therefore, reduce
the accuracy in temporal perception (Coelho et al., 2004; Fortin,
Rosseau, Bourque, & Kirouac, 1993).
In contrast, the subjective experience of time passage
in MCI patients has not been studied in the literature, to the
best of our knowledge. This, we argue, constitutes a major
limitation of current studies, since it is precisely the sub-
jective experience of the passing of time that is likely to have
a signiﬁcant impact on memory deﬁcits. If the perception of
the passage of time is dependent upon memory (Bergson,
1889), we may speculate that patients with MCI might have a
hindered perception of time passage. It is also possible that
patients with MCI are less able to engage in novel activities
requiring emotional or intellectual commitment, and thereby
believe the time is passing more slowly (Sucala et al., 2010).
To test this hypothesis, as well as to conﬁrm the lack of
differences in interval length judgements, in the present study
we analyzed time perception in MCI patients with respect to
interval length and passage of time judgments on short
durations (seconds, minutes), using both the prospective
paradigm and the retrospective paradigm, both for verbal
time estimation and for verbal time production (Coelho et al.,
2004). Time perception of longer intervals (hours, days,
weeks) and the perceived speed of time passage in MCI
were also assessed. An interesting aspect was to see whether
time perception in patients with MCI would be better or
worse than in controls, that is, closer to or farther from the
objectively measured temporal values.
METHODS
Participants
MCI patients were recruited at a dementia outpatient clinic
and a memory clinic, both in Lisbon. Controls were volun-
teers with no cognitive complaints from senior universities in
Lisbon. The study was approved by the ethical committee of
the Faculty of Medicine/ Santa Maria Hospital in Lisbon. The
participants were informed of the experimental protocol and
gave their written consent.
Inclusion Criteria for the MCI Group
The inclusion criteria for the diagnosis of MCI were adapted
from Petersen et al., 1999, with an emphasis on amnestic MCI:
(1) presence of memory complaints; (2) abnormal memory
function, documented by the Logical Memory A below educa-
tion and age adjusted values for the Portuguese population
(1 SD) or who lost >3 points after delay. Logical Memory is a
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subtest of the Bateria de Lisboa para Avaliação das Demências
(BLAD) (Garcia, 1984; Guerreiro, 1998), a neuropsychological
battery designed to evaluate multiple cognitive domains and
validated for the Portuguese population; (3) normal general
cognitive function, determined by the Mini Mental State
Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975)
within normal values for the Portuguese population. The
Portuguese version of the test, adapted from Guerreiro et al.
(1994), was used; (4) no impairment or minimal impairment
in activities of daily living determined by the Instrumental
Activities of Daily Living Scale (IADL, Lawton & Brody,
1969), that is, no more than one item from the IADL scale was
abnormal. The Portuguese version, developed in the context of
the LADIS project, was used (Pantoni et al., 2005).
Inclusion Criteria for the Control Group
The control participants had: (1) no memory complaints;
(2) normal memory function, documented by the Logical
Memory subtest of the Bateria de Lisboa para Avaliação das
Demências (BLAD); (3) a Mini-Mental State Examination
(MMSE) with normal values for the Portuguese population;
(4) normal scores on the IADL scale, that is to say, no item
from the IADL scale was abnormal.
Inclusion Criteria for Both Groups
Native Portuguese speakers; education ≥4 years; age >45
years old.
Exclusion Criteria for Both Groups
(1) Dementia, according to DMS-IV-TR (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994). (2) The presence of major
depression according to DSM-IV-TR or serious depressive
symptoms, indicated by a score >10 points on the 15-item
Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS15, Yesavage et al., 1982–
1983). The Portuguese version of the test was used, adapted
from Barreto, Leuschner, Santos, and Sobral (2008).
(3) Neurological disorders (Parkinson’s disease, stroke, brain
tumor, signiﬁcant head trauma or epilepsy), psychiatric con-
ditions (such as autism or schizophrenia), or uncontrolled
medical illness (hypertension, metabolic, endocrine, toxic or
infectious diseases) able to interfere with cognitive perfor-
mance. (4) Psychoactive medications with possible inﬂuence
on cognitive performance. (5) History of alcohol or drug
abuse. (6) Sensory deﬁcits likely to interfere with assessment.
(7) Participants with MMSE below education-adjusted
values for the Portuguese population were excluded (<23
for equal or less than 11 years of education, <28 for more
than 11 years of education).
Assessments
All the participants were submitted to the Portuguese version
of the following instruments:
Neuropsychological Measures
(1) Tests that evaluate immediate memory (Digit Span for-
ward), working memory (Digit Span backward), and verbal
memory (Logical Memory). These tests are from the Bateria
de Lisboa para Avaliação das Demências (BLAD) (Garcia,
1984; Guerreiro, 1998). (2) Stroop test (STROOP, MacLeod,
1991). The Stroop test assesses executive functions, namely
selective attention. The Portuguese version of the test, adap-
ted from Castro et al. (2000), was used. (3) Trail Making Test
(TMT, Reitan, 1958). The TMT evaluates executive func-
tions, namely attention switching, planning and internal
ordering. The Portuguese version of the test, adapted from
Fernandez and Marcopulos (2008), was used. (4) Subjective
Memory Complaints (SMC, Schmand, Jonker, Hooijer, &
Lindeboom, 1996). The SMC is a questionnaire that assesses
memory complaints. The Portuguese version of the test,
adapted from Ginó et al. (2008), was used. (5) Prospective
and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ, Smith,
Della Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000). This is a tool to measure
self-reports of prospective and retrospective memory. A
Portuguese version was used (based on Sara da Câmara’s
master thesis, unpublished).
Emotional Status Measures
(1) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gors-
such, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI is a ques-
tionnaire that evaluates the trait and the state of anxiety. The
Portuguese version of the test, adapted from Silva (2006),
was used.
(2) The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS15). The GDS is a
questionnaire that evaluates presence and severity of
depression.
Experimental Measures of Time Perception
To evaluate time perception, all participants were asked to
complete the following tasks: an experimental protocol on
interval length and a questionnaire for the subjective passage
of time.
The experimental protocol for time perception on interval
length (Coelho et al., 2004) is a test in which participants ﬁrst
have to prospectively estimate empty intervals signaled by
auditory beeps (of 7 s, 32 s, and 58 s duration); then partici-
pants have to prospectively produce empty intervals signaled
by auditory beeps (again, of 7 s, 32 s, and 58 s duration).
For each task, every duration was repeated three times in a
pseudorandom order, so that for both estimation and pro-
duction tasks nine trials were performed. Participants were
told to start the internal counting of seconds after they heard
the ﬁrst beep and to stop counting when they heard the sec-
ond beep (in case of the estimation task) or to tell the exam-
iner when they had reached the target duration (in case of the
production task). They were speciﬁcally instructed not to
count aloud nor to perform any digital counting, or use any
body rhythm to help in the estimation. In addition,
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participants were asked, retrospectively, to estimate the time
elapsed while they were drawing a clock and during the
neuropsychological evaluation. Participants are said to have a
faster internal clock if they overestimate and underproduce
time intervals, that is, their estimations are above actual
duration while their productions are below it. On the con-
trary, participants are said to have a slower internal clock if
they underestimate and overproduce time intervals.
The questionnaire for the subjective passage of time
(Friedman & Janssen, 2010) is a tool that assesses the sub-
jective impressions of longer time intervals, that is, whether
participants experience time as passing slowly or quickly.
The test consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part has six questions
concerning how participants experience the speed at which
time seems to pass (these questions are included in the cap-
tion of Figure 1): each item is to be rated on a ﬁve-point scale,
ranging from very slow (−2) to very fast (+2). Two questions
ask about our time experience in the present, the ﬁrst con-
cerning our typical experience of time (“How long does time
usually pass for you?”) and the second referring to a speciﬁc
time perception (“How long do you expect the next hour to
pass?”). The other four questions cover the perception of the
past, focusing on various time intervals (last week, last
month, last year, and the past 10 years).
The global perceived speed of time is measured as a
composite speed-of-time score, which is the sum of the six
questionnaire items (Friedman & Janssen, 2010). The second
part includes 11 statements about the subject’s experience of
time (see the leftmost column of Table 3), which the partici-
pants have to rate on a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly
disagree” (−3) to “strongly agree” (+3). The statements of the
subjective experience of time were conceived to evaluate
the impact of subjective impressions of life experience on the
subjective feelings of time passage, focusing on: (a) the effects
of recent life changes (items 1–4), since it is thought that more
activity and more life experiences would give the impression
that time is moving at a fast pace; (b) forward telescoping
(items 5–7), that is, the temporal displacement of a distant event
could make it look more recent than it actually was, thus
conveying the impression that the time is passing quickly; and
(c) the amount of pressure and rushing one experiences in life
(items 8–11), since feelings like being always busy or never
having enough time to get things done usually sustain the
sensation that time is ﬂeeting.
Statistical Analysis
Sample size was estimated from a power analysis using the
Power and Precision (v.4; BioStat; Englewood, NJ) software.
For previous sample statistical estimates required for sample
size calculation, preliminary data from 20 participants
(10 MCI and 10 controls) was used. The values obtained for
estimation of time (7 s) were 17.1± 6.3 s in MCI patients and
13.7± 3.5 s in controls. With such estimates, to detect a
signiﬁcant difference between MCI and controls, assuming
a power = 90%, α = 0.05, and two-tailed Student’s t test,
100 participants (50 MCI and 50 controls) would be required.
Demographic, clinical and neuropsychological data were
compared between the 2 groups, MCI and controls, with the
Student’s t test for numerical variables and χ2 for categorical
variables.
Analysis on time perception using the prospective para-
digm and short intervals was performed with a mixed effects
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Patients
with MCI and controls were used to evaluate between-
subjects effects, while time (7 s, 32 s, 58 s) and order of pre-
sentation (1st, 2nd, 3rd) were used to evaluate within-subjects
effects. When signiﬁcant effects were detected with the
ANOVA, Students’ t tests were performed with Bonferroni
corrections, to identify the groups differences. Effect sizes
were estimated by the partial eta squared (η2P) calculated by
SPSS. Differences in the retrospective paradigm on long
intervals between the 2 groups were evaluated with the Stu-
dent’s t test. The differences in the perceived speed of time
between the two groups were assessed using a composite
speed-of-time score (Friedman & Janssen, 2010). Differences
in individual items scores were additionally explored with the
same test. The scores of the statements about the subjective
experience of time were also compared using the Student’s
t test. The correlational analysis between neuropsychological
variables and the composite speed-of-time scale score was
performed with the Pearson’s correlation.
Fig. 1. Perceived speed of time. The ratings of the perceived
speed of time questionnaire are shown (mean± SE). Items:
1. How fast does time usually pass for you? 2. How fast do you
expect the next hour to pass? 3. How fast did the previous week
pass for you? 4. How fast did the previous month pass for you?
5. How fast did the previous year pass for you? 6. How fast did the
previous 10 years pass for you?). Participants rated the statements
on a ﬁve-point scale that ranged from ‘very slowly? [−2] to ‘very
fast’ [2]. *Statistically signiﬁcant; Independent samples Student’s
t tests.
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Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS for
Windows (SPSS 19; SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Effects with
p values < .05 were considered statistically signiﬁcant.
RESULTS
One hundred twelve participants, 57 controls and 55 MCI
patients, were submitted to neuropsychological evaluation,
an experimental protocol for time perception on both short
intervals and long intervals and a questionnaire on subjective
passage of time. There were no statistically signiﬁcant
differences in age, education, gender, and activity/retirement
status between the two groups (Table 1).
Neuropsychological Characteristics
As expected, the MCI participants had lower MMSE scores,
worse performances in cognitive tests, namely memory
(Logical Memory, Digit Span) and executive functions tests
(Trail A and B, Stroop test), and presented more subjective
memory complaints (SMC, PMRQ) as well as anxiety
(STAI) and depressive (GDS) symptoms than controls
(Table 1).
Time Perception on Interval Length
In the prospective paradigm on short intervals, the time
estimates were above the actual times, and the time produc-
tions were under the actual times, for the three times
considered (7 s, 32 s, 58 s), in both MCI patients and controls,
as widely known from previous studies (Table 2). There were
no signiﬁcant differences between MCI patients and controls
on time estimate (repeated measures ANOVA, F
(1,110) = 0.138; p = .711; η2p = 0.0013). Furthermore, no
interactions between the diagnostic group and the time (7 s,
32 s, 58 s; repeated measures ANOVA, F(2,220) = 0.072;
p = .930; η2p = 0.0006) and the diagnostic group and the
order of presentation (1st, 2nd, 3rd; repeated measures
ANOVA, F(2,220) = 0.971; p = .380; η2p = 0.0087) were
found on average time estimates. There were also no
signiﬁcant differences between MCI patients and controls
on time production (repeated measures ANOVA, F
(1,110) = 0.043; p = .837; η2p = 0.0003). No interactions
between the diagnostic group and the time (7 s, 32 s, 58 s;
repeated measures ANOVA, F(2,220) = 0.021; p = .980,
η2p = 0.0001) and the diagnostic group and the order of
presentation (1st, 2nd, 3rd; repeated measures ANOVA, F
(2,220) = 1.190; p = .306; η2p = 0.0107) were found on
average time production.
Regarding the retrospective paradigm on long intervals,
there were no signiﬁcant differences in the estimates of the
time required to draw the clock and the duration of the
interview between MCI patients and controls (Table 2).
Perception on Subjective Passage of Time
Regarding the perceived speed of time passage, the compo-
site speed-of-time scale score was signiﬁcantly lower in MCI
patients (0.58± 0.9) as compared to controls (0.73± 0.8;
t(670) = −2.341; p = .02; Student’s t test), meaning that the
MCI patients reported the time to be passing slower. The
individual scores for the 6 time questions are shown in
Figure 1. In all the questions, except question 2 that relates to
the anticipated speed of time in the next hour, the MCI
Table 1. Demographic and neuropsychological characterization
MCI (n = 55) CONTROL (n = 57) p-Value
AGE, years, mean (SD) 70.9 (8.9) 67.6 (8.5) .05a
EDUCATION, years, mean (SD) 10.9 (4.4) 11.1 (4.5) .74a
GENDER, female/male, n 36/19 35/22 .66b
ACTIVITY, active/retired, n 8/47 7/50 .73b
MINI-MENTAL STATE EXAMINATION, mean (SD) 27.2 (2.2) 29.1 (1.1) <.01a
LOGICAL MEMORY A (immediate recall), mean (SD) 7.1 (3.3) 15.0 (4.1) <.01a
LOGICAL MEMORY A (delayed recall), mean (SD) 5.5 (3.7) 15.1 (4.4) <.01a
DIGIT SPAN FORWARD, mean (SD) 5.5 (0.7) 5.8 (1.2) .14a
DIGIT SPAN BACKWARD, mean (SD) 3.9 (1.1) 4.4 (1.0) .01a
STROOP TEST (interference), mean (SD) 22.0 (7.5) 30.4 (9.2) <.01a
TRAIL MAKING TEST A, seconds, mean (SD) 79.0 (37.6) 51.0 (21.3) <.01a
TRAIL MAKING TEST B, seconds, mean (SD) 191.1 (54.7) 139.9 (57.9) <.01a
SUBJECTIVE MEMORY COMPLAINTS, mean (SD) 9.6 (3.6) 5.5 (3.0) <.01a
PMRQ (prospective memory), mean (SD) 22.7 (5.9) 17.5 (3.8) <.01a
PMRQ (retrospective memory), mean (SD) 22.4 (4.8) 18.1 (4.3) <.01a
STATE TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY (trace), mean (SD) 39.9 (9.8) 32.5 (9.0) <.01a
GERIATRIC DEPRESSION SCALE, mean (SD) 4.2 (2.4) 2.2 (1.7) <.01a
Note. Statistically signiﬁcant values are shown in bold.
aIndependent samples Student’s t tests.
bPearson chi-square test.
MCI, mild cognitive impairment; SD, standard deviation; PMRQ, prospective and retrospective memory questionnaire.
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patients reported the time to be passing slower, and QTI3
(How fast did the last week pass for you?, t(110) = −2.252;
p = .03; Student’s t test), and QTI4 (How fast did the last
month pass for you?, t(110) = −2.063; p = .04; Student’s
t test) differed signiﬁcantly between the two groups.
An exploratory analysis was performed on the statements
about the subjective experience of time. No differences were
found between MCI patients and controls except on item 2
(In the past several years my life has been quite a routine),
where MCI patients described their life as being more like a
routine (Table 3).
Perceived Speed of Time and Cognition
Since signiﬁcant differences in the perceived speed of time were
found between the MCI patients and control participants, it
would be important to know whether the perceived speed of
time could be related to performance in neuropsychological
domains, as well as anxiety and depression symptoms. In
control participants, no correlations were found between the
speed-of-time scale score and performances in cognitive tests,
subjective memory, depressive or anxiety complaints (Table 4).
In contrast, in MCI patients there was a positive correlation
between the speed-of-time scale score and performance on
Logical Memory A (both immediate and with delay), that is,
patients with more severe memory deﬁcits felt that time was
passing more slowly (Table 4). There was also a positive
correlation between the speed-of-time scale score and the SMC
score, that is, patients with less cognitive complaints perceived
time as being slower (Table 4).
It is important to add that no statistically signiﬁcant
correlation was detected in MCI patients between SMC score
and Logical Memory A (both immediate and with delay),
meaning that patients with more cognitive deﬁcits were not
those who necessarily had more cognitive complaints.
No statistically signiﬁcant correlations were found in MCI
patients between the speed-of-time scale score and perfor-
mances in executive tests, nor with depressive or anxiety
complaints (Table 4).
Of interest, item 2 of the statements about the subjective
experience of time was also negatively and signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with Logical Memory A, both immediate (r = −0.31;
p = .02) and with delay (r = −0.44; p < .01): that is, in MCI
patients, the more severe memory deﬁcits were, the more life
felt like a routine.
DISCUSSION
The main ﬁnding of this study is that MCI patients have
alterations in the perception of the subjective passage of time,
that is, they experience time as if it is passing more slowly,
Table 2. Time Perception on Interval Length
MCI Mean ± SD CONTROL Mean ± SD p-Value
PROSPECTIVE PARADIGM (SHORT INTERVALS)
Time Estimation 7 s 14.4± 5.0 14.5± 5.2 .71a
14.6± 6.1 15.3± 7.1
14.5± 5.9 15.2± 6.7
32 s 51.2± 17.5 54.2± 17.8
54.5± 19.8 56.2± 21.0
54.7± 18.3 55.1± 19.7
58 s 90.4± 29.3 93.7± 31.4
91.5± 31.3 92.4± 33.5
93.2± 31.6 93.8± 34.2
Time Production 7 s 4.8± 2.2 4.5± 2.3 .84a
5.0± 2.9 4.9± 2.3
5.1± 2.9 5.0± 2.8
32 s 19.9± 9.5 18.7± 9.4
20.3± 9.6 20.2± 10.1
19.9± 10.8 20.0± 10.6
58 s 37.3± 16.1 36.4± 16.7
37.9± 17.8 37.3± 18.2
37.2± 19.1 36.9± 18.1
RETROSPECTIVE PARADIGM (LONG INTERVALS)
Time to draw a clock s −23.9b± 84.1 −4.6b± 58.4 .16c
Time of the interview s 12.8b± 591.9 −74.7b± 549.6 .42c
Note. For each time, the three values concern the ﬁrst, second, and third presentation of the same interval length.
aAn analysis of repeated measures showed no signiﬁcant statistically differences (p < .05) between the Control group and the MCI group in prospective time.
bThe values concern the difference between real time and time estimation. Large standard deviations stem from the variability of time estimates as well as high
variability of the real time, that is, participants took rather different intervals to draw a clock or had variable interview times.
cIndependent samples Student’s t tests.
MCI, mild cognitive impairment; SD, standard deviation.
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compared to healthy controls. Remarkably, an abnormal
internal clock was not the basis for these alterations in the
perception of the subjective passage of time, since perception
of the interval lengths was not different in MCI patients as
compared to controls. These ﬁndings replicate a previous
study, that used a prospectively time estimation paradigm,
where participants were told in advance to estimate short time
intervals (10 s, 25 s, 45 s, 60 s), and did not ﬁnd changes
in estimation of the interval length in MCI patients (Rueda
& Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2009). Another study asked
participants to retrospectively estimate a longer time interval,
the duration of an interview (administration 25 to 30min)
(Heinik & Ayalon, 2010), and again did not ﬁnd changes in
MCI patients, although it is worth noticing that controls in
this study were psycho-geriatric referrals with cognitive
complaints, not healthy participants.
The present study has the advantage to propose an exten-
sive and detailed analysis of interval length perception, in
well-characterized MCI patients and healthy controls. We
used both the prospective paradigm and the retrospective
Table 3. Statements about the subjective experience of time
MCI Mean ± SD CONTROL Mean ± SD p-Valuea
1. The past two years have been a time ﬁlled with many new experiences −0.06± 1.62 0.46± 1.34 .07
2. In the past several years my life has been quite a routine 0.54± 1.57 −0.16± 1.57 .02
3. When I think back over the past two years, few notable events came to
my mind
0.07± 1.72 −0.11± 1.67 .58
4. There have been few notable changes in my life in the past year 0.67± 1.72 0.58± 1.66 .79
5. When I try to remember the date of some event, I often come up with a
time that is not as long as the true time
0.19± 1.85 0.74± 1.32 .07
6. When I think that something was just a few years ago, it often turns out
that it happened long before that
0.78± 1.63 0.46± 1.67 .31
7. I often ﬁnd that things occurred much longer ago than I thought 0.94± 1.43 0.49± 1.54 .11
8. There is often not enough time to do everything I want or need to do 0.98± 1.74 1.18± 1.50 .53
9. I frequently have to rush to make sure everything gets done 0.72± 1.76 0.88± 1.56 .62
10. I usually have plenty of time for all things I want to accomplish in a day 0.20± 1.96 0.26± 1.67 .86
11. These days I am not very busy 0.43± 2.00 0.09±1.88 .36
Note. Participants rated the statements on a seven-point scale that ranged from ‘strongly disagree’ [−3] to ‘strongly agree’ [3]. Statistically signiﬁcant values are
shown in bold.
aIndependent samples Student’s t tests.
MCI, mild cognitive impairment; SD, standard deviation.
Table 4. Correlations between composite speed of time scale score and neuropsychological variables
QTavg
r p-Value
LOGICAL MEMORY A (immediate recall) MCI 0.45 <.01
CONTROL 0.05 .74
LOGICAL MEMORY A (delayed recall) MCI 0.44 <.01
CONTROL 0.04 .78
TRAIL MAKING TEST B MCI −0.27 .05
CONTROL 0.10 .46
GERIATRIC DEPRESSION SCALE MCI 0.22 .11
CONTROL 0.14 .30
STATE TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY (trace) MCI 0.16 .32
CONTROL 0.12 .37
SUBJECTIVE MEMORY COMPLAINTS MCI 0.39 <.01
CONTROL 0.16 .24
PMRQ (prospective memory) MCI 0.15 .27
CONTROL 0.03 .82
PMRQ (retrospective memory) MCI −0.07 .63
CONTROL −0.02 .89
Note. Statistically signiﬁcant values are shown in bold.
MCI, mild cognitive impairment; QTavg, composite speed of time-scale score; r, Pearson’s correlation; PMRQ, prospective and retro-
spective memory questionnaire.
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paradigm and the methods of verbal estimation and produc-
tion of time intervals. No differences in prospective (7 s, 32 s,
58 s) and retrospective (time to draw a clock, time of the
interview) time estimates were found in MCI patients. No
differences in prospective time intervals production (7 s, 32 s,
58 s) were detected either. As mentioned, each duration in the
prospective paradigm (7 s, 32 s, 58 s) was repeated three
times (1st, 2nd, 3rd) in a pseudorandom order, both in time
estimation and in time production. Again, MCI patients did
not show any drift along the different periods of time, or in
the order of presentation, either in time estimation or in time
production, as compared to control participants.
It is interesting to note that normal subjects, in the pro-
spective paradigm on short intervals, tend to make time
estimates that are above the actual times, and produce time
intervals that are under the actual times (Carrasco, Bernal,
& Redolat, 2001; Coelho et al., 2004). This ﬁnding was
replicated in the present study. Usually, older adults are said
to have faster internal clocks than younger adults, since they
overestimate time intervals (Coelho et al., 2004; Fraisse,
1963). Regarding the age effect, it is fair to say that MCI
patients do not tend either to exaggerate, or to correct, the
deviations normally observed with respect to objective
durations. This suggests that their internal clock is consistent
with normal aging.
The subjective passage of time, as far as we know, had not
been previously investigated in MCI patients. Doing so in the
current study allowed to discover that MCI patients, despite
their “healthy” internal clock, experience time as passing
slower than controls, as shown by a signiﬁcantly lower
speed-of-time scale score, and had generally lower individual
scores for the items related to the past. In this respect, MCI
differs from normal aging, since old adults report the time to
pass more quickly, rather than more slowly, when compared
to young adults (Friedman & Janssen, 2010; Wittmann &
Lehnhoff, 2005).
Results on statements about the subjective experience
of time also revealed that MCI patients believed the time
passing more like a routine than controls (item 2). This may
reﬂect the forced abandonment of some complex activities of
daily living that MCI experience (Pedrosa et al., 2010). From
the present data, the overall level of personal activity/
engagement did not affect differently MCI patients and con-
trols, as far as subjective time perception was concerned. The
level of personal activity is known to inﬂuence time percep-
tion, as people less active tend to feel as if the time is passing
more slowly (Fraisse, 1963). Thus, if MCI participants were
less active due to their condition, this may had inﬂuenced
their perception of time; however, if controls were also
engaged in less activity, for example, due to normal aging,
they might report time passage the same way as MCI patients
did. Of interest, other aspects of the subject’s experience of
time, like forward telescoping (item 5–7) and life pressures
(item 8–11), did not reveal differences between MCI patients
and controls.
Since the internal clock was not found to be impaired in
MCI patients, it would be important to look for other reasons
that could explain the changes that MCI patients showed in
the perceived speed of time. Previous studies emphasized the
importance of memory and executive functions for time
perception (Heinik & Ayalon, 2010; Papagno, Allegra, &
Cardaci, 2004), as well as emotional factors, such as
depression and anxiety (Nichelli, 1993). We found that the
speed-of-time scale score was correlated with memory tests
in MCI patients, that is, patients with more severe memory
deﬁcits felt that time was passing more slowly.
The inﬂuence of memory deﬁcits on the distortion of per-
ceived speed of time seems speciﬁc, since (1) it was only
observed in MCI patients, not in healthy controls, and (2)
speed-of-time scores correlated with memory results but not
with performance in executive tests or with complaints of
depression or anxiety, even if MCI patients presented
abnormalities on all these measures. It is interesting to add
that patients with poorer memory were also those who felt the
time passing more like a routine, conﬁrming that memory
deﬁcits are associated with alterations in the subjective
experience of time. Remarkably, patients with less severe
memory complaints were also those who felt time as passing
most slowly. The fact that memory complaints did not cor-
relate with memory deﬁcits suggests that subjective memory
complaints may not accurately reﬂect memory deﬁcits in
patients with cognitive impairment (see, for instance, Silva
et al., 2014).
The relationship between memory deﬁcits and the distor-
tion of perceived speed of time certainly reinforces the con-
cept, advanced by previous authors (Graf & Grodin, 2006;
Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1990; Mimura et al., 2000; Schmitter-
Edgecombe & Rueda, 2008), that memory is necessary to
time perception. The idea of a connection between time
perception and memory is not a modern one. It can be traced
back to Aristotle, according to whom memory is what allows
us to place events in time and to count them (Ricoeur, 2004).
In fact, ancient philosophers like Aristotle and Saint Augustin
argued that our sense of time passage is due to memory
operations, although they emphasized the thought that
we become acquainted of that passage by measuring time
intervals, an idea that still prevails in current time studies.
Later, in the nineteenth century, philosophers and psy-
chologists (Guyau, 1890; James, 1890) studied human tem-
poral distortions and related them with memory changes
(Guyau, 1890). However, these studies focused on the ability
to count time intervals and on the quantitative aspect of time
perception. Bergson was the ﬁrst to drive attention toward the
qualitative aspect of time perception and its association with
memory (Guerlac, 2006). Indeed, Bergson famously expres-
sed the radical thought that time is memory, a succession
of qualitative states that interpenetrate and mix together
(Bergson, 1889). The relevance of memory for time percep-
tion is certainly recognized by contemporary researchers,
who have also called the attention to non-cognitive processes,
namely qualitative sensations expressed by emotional and
visceral states, that are not necessarily part of the core time-
keeping system, but contribute to our self-experience and the
subjective judgments of time passage (Wittmann, 2009).
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In conclusion, MCI patients experience time as passing
more slowly than controls. Since time perception is an
essential component of everyday goal oriented behaviors,
this altered experience of time may contribute to some of the
symptoms that patients with MCI report, especially memory
deﬁcits and difﬁculties in activities of daily life.
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